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Carol Cohn[a]* and Claire Duncanson[b]

[a] *Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Boston, MA, USA;* [b]*Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK*

Dr Carol Cohn
Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights
Wheatley 6-064
University of Massachusetts Boston
100 Morrissey Blvd.
Boston, MA 02125
USA
carol.cohn@genderandsecurity.org

Dr Claire Duncanson
School of Social and Political Science
University of Edinburgh
4.24 Chrystal Macmillan Building
15a George Square
Edinburgh EH8 9LD
0131 650 4624
c.p.duncanson@ed.ac.uk

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In this article we argue that a feminist political economy (FPE) approach is critical in understanding why standard policy prescriptions for post-war economic recovery fail to support the building of sustainably peaceful countries and secure lives for their citizens. Whilst many scholars criticise the IFIs' policies in war-affected countries, our FPE approach provides two overlooked but crucial insights. First, it reveals the disjunction (indeed, chasm) between a country's economic recovery from war and the IFI's focus on the recovery of the economic system. Second, it locates the conceptual underpinnings of this chasm in the profoundly gendered assumptions of neoclassical economics. That is, we find the IFIs' failure to prioritize financing the social infrastructure that could repair war's damages, enhance human security, and support the ecosystems on which human security depends has its roots in the fundamental misconception of human reproductive, caring and subsistence labour, and of nature, as external to the economy rather than as central to the ability of the formal economy to function. We illustrate these points with a focus on one pervasive example of the IFIs' approach to post-war recovery, their encouragement of the large-scale extraction and export of natural resources. Finally, we show how adopting the work of feminist economists who emphasise care, social reproduction and the value of nature, though not without its challenges, can offer radically new visions for post-war economies.

Keywords: feminist economics, feminist political economy, IFIs, peacebuilding, post-war economic recovery, security, sustaining peace, women, natural resources, extractivism

I. Introduction

Although gender and peacebuilding have garnered tremendous amounts of feminist attention in recent years, remarkably little of that attention has focused on the transnational economic processes and actors that shape post-war economies. This is a major oversight. Everything from the day-to-day security of women's lives, to the likelihood of peace agreements' provisions being implemented and the sustainability of peace itself are deeply shaped by, and too often undermined by, the transnational economic actors who promulgate post-war economic policies, and the international and national actors who carry them out. Therefore, if our aim is to find a path to gender-equitable, sustainable peace, we need to bring feminist lenses to an analysis of these dynamics. In other words: if our concern, as feminists, is with peacebuilding – how to repair war's harms and effect the transformations that enhance human security, reduce physical and structural violence, and make long term sustainable peace possible – then we must attend to the transnational economic forces that shape the economic, social and political conditions of countries emerging from conflict.

One of the key transnational economic processes shaping post-war countries is the entry of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other donors to design and finance the countries' economic recovery strategy. In this paper, we look at the IFIs' out-size role in determining economic recovery policy, focusing on the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). In particular, we look at one of the strategies for economic recovery promoted by the IFIs: the extraction and export of natural resources, and we argue that this strategy, like other neoliberal economic recovery policies, both a) neglects what is needed to address the destructions, disruptions and distortions caused by war, and b) undermines the transformations needed for sustainable peace, instead deepening the social and economic inequalities that contributed to war in the first place. We draw on post-war economic reconstruction in Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea to illustrate our case that this approach to natural resources fails to improve human security and other aspects of economic recovery after war, and indeed, tends to deepen inequalities and thus undermine sustainable peace.

We argue that a feminist political economy (FPE) approach is critical for fully grasping how it does both those things, for this approach to natural resources – like other elements of the IFI's recipe for post-war recovery – has its roots not just in neoliberalism, but in the profoundly gendered neoclassical economic model underlying it. Thus, feminist economic perspectives that challenge the gendered assumptions of neoclassical economics must become the basis for radically new solutions for post-war economic reconstruction. We show how adopting the work of feminist economists and ecologists who emphasise care and social reproduction, human rights, and our interdependence with nature, though not without its challenges, can offer radically new visions for post-war economies, creating conditions which will make peace more sustainable.[1]

[1] It should be clear from this introduction that in our Feminist Political Economy approach, we employ gender as an analytical tool; it helps us see what is privileged, what is devalued, and what is rendered invisible in societies and systems of thought.
At the same time, because these systems – here, our specific focus is on neoclassical economics and neoliberal policies – are built on gendered assumptions, they have differential gendered impacts, affecting men, women and other gender categories differently, *as groups*,

II. Post-War Recovery and IFI Economic Policy: An FPE Critique

Feminists economists have long drawn attention to the flaws in neoliberal policies, such as the extraction and export of natural resources, and the neoclassical economics that underpins them (see e.g. UN Women, 2014; UN Women, 2015). But they have rarely applied those critiques to post-war recovery. Critical peace and security scholars, meanwhile, have also criticized the neoliberal policies of IFIs (see e.g., Peterson, 2014; Pugh, 2006), but rarely from a feminist perspective. In this section, we analyze some of the main strands of critique of IFI post-war economic recovery policy, before laying out our feminist approach.

Our emphasis is on the IFIs because in most post-war states it is simply not possible to grasp the gendered realities of post-war experience, nor, indeed, the contours of post-war states themselves, without an understanding of the macro-economic context (Jacobson, 2012). And whilst there are many other economic actors in post-war contexts, including other lenders and donors, they tend to accept and work within the overall macro-economic framework for recovery and development set out by the IFIs (True and Svedberg 2018; Woodward 2013).

In any assessment of IFI policies in post-war countries, it is important to note that the IFIs' approach has not stayed static. Over the post-Cold War period, the World Bank and IMF began to show signs of recognition that post-war contexts pose a set of distinctive challenges. From the mid-1990s, the Bank began to advocate for more of a role for states and institutions in planning and regulating economic policy in order to tackle the inequalities which lead to violence (Woodward, 2013, pp. 141–142). This is

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even whilst other intersecting inequalities create differential impacts *within* each of those groups. In this article, our focus is on how they affect women as a group, whilst recognising that this is a diverse and contested category, as well as on how they affect other inequalities and the prospects for the sustainability of peace.

evident in Bank reports such as *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Collier et al., 2003), the *World Development Report* on *Conflict, Security and Development* (World Bank 2011), and its most recent work on Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Meanwhile, the IMF produced a 2011 policy paper conceding that it had been "too bold" and "too optimistic" in its prescriptions – its standard macroeconomic adjustments including cutting state spending, privatization, and orienting the economy to export – for post-war countries in the past (IMF, 2011), and also endorsed a bigger role for governments to manage post-war recovery.[2]

Despite these efforts to adapt and improve their response to states attempting to recover from war, the IFIs' approach to recovery has continued to be criticised. We can identify three strands of literature critical of IFIs in post-war countries. One strand of critique focuses on relatively technical issues, such as sequencing and timing, flexibility and coordination (see e.g. del Castillo, 2017; Langer & Brown, 2016). In this account, the IFIs fail because, despite the shifts in recent years, they have continued to insist on implementing neoliberal "development as usual" policies too early, instead of postponing them until after efforts to focus on peacebuilding objectives such as providing jobs for ex-combatants.

An overlapping but slightly different strand of the literature criticises the IFIs as still, despite the aforementioned shifts, not sufficiently recognising how their policies exacerbate the inequalities and violence of the war economy contexts (see e.g. Berdal & Wennmann, 2013; Walter, 2015). There is a greater recognition, in this second strand, that it just not an issue of timing or co-ordination, but that there may need to be an enhanced role for the state in order to ensure the smooth running of the economy. In this

[2] These shifts can be seen as part of the move to a "Post-Washington Consensus" (PWC), the extent and significance of which, of course, is much contested (Krogstad, 2007; Peterson, 2014; Pugh, 2006).

critique, neoliberal economic policies are seen as sound in general, but further institutional reform and strengthening are required to tackle the way profits are subject to elite capture and corruption in post-war periods. Neither of these strands question the IFIs' pursuit of economic growth as the goal and measure of post-war economic recovery.

A third set of scholars argue that it is the neoliberal model of the IFIs itself which is the problem (see e.g. Peterson, 2014; Pugh, 2006; Pugh, Cooper, & Turner, 2008; Woodward, 2013). For these critics, however much the IFIs' approach to post-war societies has been modulated in recent years, what remains the same is that the IFIs aim to create a state that facilitates private-sector, market-led growth. And the IFIs continue to be motivated more by the state's capacity to service its foreign debt than the well-being of its citizens or its ability to enact the social, economic and political transformations which are required for peace to be sustainable. The role for the state envisioned in the IFIs' version of "good governance" is "that which is considered necessary for markets and the private sector to function and no more" (Woodward, 2013, p. 144).

We find much to agree with in the third strand's critique, but still find it lacking in important ways. We agree that the problem is rooted in the IFIs' continuing commitment – despite shifts in rhetoric and modifications to policy and practice – to neoliberal views as to what leads to and counts as economic success. We agree with the analysis that although the IFIs have shifted to endorse a role for governments and government policies for post-war economic recovery, the role they envisage for governments remains relatively limited, restricted to ensuring markets operate fairly and efficiently (i.e. "good governance") and to providing safety nets for the most marginalized and excluded. And we agree that the shifts have not included any

deviation from a commitment to economic growth as the route to poverty reduction, nor any questioning of deeper integration into the global capitalist economy as the surest formula for economic growth.

However, we think that integrating a feminist analysis reveals two critical insights which are even more fundamental. The first concerns the question of whose recovery is being prioritized, or what the "subject" of recovery is. The second looks beyond the critique of neoliberalism to explore the way that the IFIs' neoliberal approach to post-war recovery is based on a neo*classical* economics, which, as many feminist political economists, economists and ecologists have pointed out, is profoundly gendered.

Whose Recovery?

A basic, but critical, feminist move when confronting the social sciences has been to ask the deceptively simple question: who, or what, is this theory about? Upon whose experience has it been based? A feminist approach to IFI post-war economic recovery prescriptions, then, leads us to ask the fundamental question, what does post-war "economic recovery" mean? To whom or what does it refer? A layperson hearing the phrase might start by thinking about *recovery from war*, and ask what are the economic dimensions of that recovery? However, in the way the term is used by economists, it means something quite different – the *recovery of the economic system,* or the health of the economy as measured by indicators such as GDP. So how are these two meanings different, and why is it important to our discussion?

An FPE approach, which starts from the perspective of the most-marginalized, helps reveal that the economic dimensions of recovery from war are multiple and significant. When we center the day-to-day experiences of people who have survived

the war, what economic needs become most salient? First, there is the need to rebuild and restore what war too often destroys. Although these needs will always be context specific, the rebuilding will likely include needs such as: homes; tools, markets, workshops, factories and other means of livelihood; bicycles, carts, cars, buses and other forms of mobility; roads, bridges, railways, power grids, schools, hospitals and clinics, and more. Restoration needs will likely include not only domestic animals and agricultural plots, but the eco-systems that wars disrupt and despoil, and upon which communities depend.

Second, beyond the rebuilding and restoration of what war has destroyed, war creates an entirely new set of needs, including: gaps caused by war's disruption of health care and education which need to be remedied; both individuals and families dealing with the injuries and traumas of war need systems of care; roads and fields need to be de-mined; widow- and child-headed households need new forms of livelihood and support, as will people disabled by the violence; and large numbers of people who have been displaced need to be resettled.

Third, there will need to be a transformation from a war economy, in which some of a country's most violent actors control and exploit both licit and illicit goods, to a peacetime economy which does not simply continue channelling economic rewards into the pockets of violence's perpetrators.

Importantly, though, the economic dimensions of *recovery from war* go beyond these repairs to war's destructions, disruptions and distortions. If peace is to be sustainable, recovery also requires the transformation of the inequalities, marginalizations and exclusions that underlie and fuel wars (see e.g. Stewart, 2008). Not only does this mean that there must be full funding for the implementation of the peace agreement's provisions (e.g., DDR, SSR, land reform, etc.) – something that all

too often does not materialize. But more fundamentally, it means that economic policy must be measured against its impact on those pre-existing inequalities – does it deepen them, ameliorate them, or even create new ones? In other words, we would argue, the economic dimensions of *recovery from war* include not only tremendous needs for repair of the material conditions, structures and physical and social services that make people's lives liveable, but also, and crucially, need for the transformation of the economic inequalities that underlie structural violence and war itself.

This understanding of the economic dimensions of recovery from war is in stark contrast to what is typically meant by "post-war economic recovery" as the term is used in the international policy community, including by the IFIs. Here, it is neither the conditions of people's lives nor a society's recovery from war that are centred, but rather the *recovery of the economic system,* or the health of the economy. A healthy economic system, for the IFIs, is one where countries are fully integrated into the global capitalist economy, with minimal barriers to the profit-maximizing goals of transnational corporations and finance.[3]

One of the crucial points we make in our critique of the IFIs, then, is this. Despite the different purposes of the two institutions, and despite change over time, neither the IMF of the World Bank is *directly* focused on a society's recovery from war or creating the conditions for sustainable peace. The IMF's remit is to protect the stability of the international monetary and financial system. The Bank's aim of poverty reduction suggests a focus on society's recovery and the conditions for peace, but in practice it addresses them only indirectly, in its assumption that economic growth will be good for everyone (if institutions are in place to ensure markets are non-corrupt,

[3] Notwithstanding the fact that there is a lot more variety of individual belief and motivation within the IFIs than blanket accounts of their institutional goals give you.

transparent and efficient). And perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the IFIs' economic recovery policies often work against social recovery and peacebuilding, or what we refer to as *real recovery*.

In other words, we are arguing that what an FPE approach does here is more than focus attention on the specific needs of post-war repair and transformation; by starting from that ground-up question, it reveals the disjunction (indeed, some might say "chasm") between *recovery from war* and *recovery of the economic system.* In so doing, it highlights and destabilizes the meaning of "post-war economic recovery" as it is used by the IFIs. And it begins to provide the basis for a different conceptualization of economic health – where the measure would not be GDP, but the extent to which the post-war economic needs outlined above are met. We believe that feminist economists alternative approaches provide a fertile source for this reconceptualization, an argument we go on to make in our final section below.

Neoclassical economics and post-war recovery

The second strand of our argument about the limitations of IFI post-war recovery policies, and the second way in which we differ from critical peacebuilding scholars such as Peterson, Pugh and Woodward, is that we go beyond the critique of the policies' neoliberalism to explore the way that the IFIs' approach is based on a profoundly gendered neo*classical* economics. We argue that the gendered assumptions embedded in neoclassical economics are central to explaining how IFI post-war economic recovery policy can be so distant from and antithetical to real, society-wide recovery from war, and can harm the prospects for sustainable peace.

Neoclassical economics' conception of what counts as economic activity, and of what should be included in its accountings of how to maximize efficiency and GDP growth, are based on a series of exclusions, and those exclusions both draw on and

reinforce an extremely distorted representation of economic life (see e.g. Benería, Berik & Floro, 2015). At the most fundamental level, it excludes non-market activities. What is then not counted in this scheme is caring labour, reproductive labour, subsistence labour and other labour outside the formal market economy (see e.g. Folbre, 2001; UN Women 2015), as well as the work done by and value of ecosystems (see e.g. Merchant, 1980; Leach 2015). These are all, somehow, simultaneously devalued, assumed nevertheless to always be there, and ignored. The failure in neoclassical economics, then, is double: it is a failure to value these forms of activity in and of themselves, but it is also, by not attending to them, a failure to understand that they are integral to the economic relationships that neoclassical economics *does* focus on – i.e., a failure to see that the formal economy *relies* on all of them, cannot function without them, and is constructed through its relation to them.

This wildly inaccurate representation of economic life embedded in neoclassical economics has several highly problematic impacts when it becomes the basis of economic policy. Here we highlight two of them, as they are particularly relevant to the challenges of countries recovering from war: the first is that it fails to count, and/or to take serious action to avoid, the harms to anything in its exclusion zone, i.e., "non-market activities." And the second is that it then mis-codes potential investment of financial resources in real recovery from war as "non-productive," inefficient, and thus unnecessary and undesirable.

The first issue, well-documented by feminist economists, is that when the neoclassical framework ignores or denies that the (part of) the economy it is counting is intertwined with and relies on the parts it is ignoring (caring labour, subsistence labour, other forms of unpaid work), economic institutions can aim for "structural adjustments" in the formal economy without ever noticing the increased burdens that puts on women

(who bear so much responsibility for reproductive, caring and subsistence labour) and without counting those burdens as economic harms to the women or the economic system itself. Hence the extensive feminist literature demonstrating SAPs' harmful impacts on women and other subordinated groups (e.g., Elson, 1991; Çağatay & Özler, 1995). A related dynamic is at work in relation to neoclassical economics' exclusion of the costs of the environmental degradation, toxic pollution and climate disruption that result from the IFIs' post-war economic recovery policies, including the large-scale extraction of natural resources. Corporations are not required to pay these costs, which lie outside neoclassical accounting of efficiency and measures such as GDP. And, since there is no accounting of the caring, subsistence and provisioning labour done by women and poor people, the fact that these environmental costs make their work so much more burdensome in the present and far into the future is unremarked, and certainly not guarded against. The effect is to deepen gender and other intersectional inequalities, thus immiserating large swathes of the population and attenuating the prospects for sustainable peace.

The second issue arising from neoclassical economics' blindness to the ways that the market activity it measures *relies* on "non-market" activities is that it then mis-codes potential investment of financial resources in real recovery from war as non-productive, inefficient, and thus unnecessary and undesirable. That is, because caring, subsistence and other forms of non-market activity are not acknowledged as the very foundation upon which market activity depends, they do not appear as a sensible or necessary place to invest financial resources. So any of the multiple economic needs for remedy and repair of war's harms that we discussed in Section III tend to be seen as largely irrelevant to "economic recovery." As we've seen, there may be recognition that a few of those issues need some (typically minimal) attention (such as employment

for some ex-combatants) before the real business of economic recovery policy proceeds. Or there may be a sense that there should be a minimalist social safety net for the poorest of the poor. But because of the assumptive framework of neoclassical economics, putting resources into the social infrastructure that could begin to repair war's harms is (mis)understood and accounted for as consumption – not an investment in what makes the economy tick (Seguino, 2016).[4]

And that, we think, is the crux of it. The problem is not just a lack of government revenue to finance the social infrastructure that could repair war's damages, enhance human security, and support the ecosystems on which human security depends. It is that such investment is completely deprioritized, indeed prevented, by policies such as the limits the IMF imposes on a country's public debt relative to GDP (see Seguino, 2016), which are based on the fundamental misconception of human reproductive, caring and subsistence labour, and of nature, as external to the economy, rather than as central to the ability of the formal economy to function.

III. Natural Resource Extraction, and Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville

This section illustrates our arguments by examining one common element of the IFIs' approach to post-war economic reconstruction – the promotion of large-scale extraction and export of natural resources – in three post-war countries. Our aim is to demonstrate the particular insights an FPE approach provides.

The IFIs promote the large-scale extraction and export of natural resources because it is an obvious means of economic growth and a way to bring in foreign

[4] Seguino (2016) discusses this point in relation to the question of how the Sustainable Development Goals may be financed, (not the financing of post-war recovery), but we think her arguments have much to offer for post-war contexts, as we go on to discus in section V.

currency which will enable the country to service its debt. This suits the extractive industries, for whom post-war countries are often attractive targets, the last frontier—in contrast to countries not affected by war, where rights to oil, gas, minerals, and other resources have already been largely allocated (see e.g. Bruch, Muffett, & Nichols, 2016; Klare, 2012; Pugh et al., 2008). From the perspective of the countries themselves, having a wealth of natural resources which can be extracted, however, is rather more complicated, especially since, in many cases, the wealth generated by those resources has both fuelled and funded decades of war.[5] Despite this troubled past, the IFIs, committed to their faith that good governance will prevent a repeat of history, prescribe large-scale extraction for export as a key plan of the economic growth they believe to be the route to, and representative of, recovery.

Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville are three very different post-war settings, from three continents, with different histories, geographies and cultures, and with different war trajectories. As Guatemala's Peace Accord was signed in 1996, Bougainville's in 2001, and Liberia's in 2003, sufficient time has elapsed since the signing of the peace agreement to enable us to assess the impacts of IFI's prescriptions for post-war recovery and specifically their focus on the large-scale extraction and export of natural resources – extractivism – across these very different locales.

In the case of Guatemala, the country's orientation to extraction and export had begun before the war ended, but the peace accords offered the opportunity for IFIs and domestic elites to speed up the process (see e.g. Jonas, 2000; Robinson, 2000; Short, 2007). With World Bank blessings and support, Guatemala immediately reformed and

[5] The so-called "resource curse," in both war-torn and post-war countries, has now been the subject of a considerable literature (for overviews see e.g. Benner & Oliviera, 2013; Bruch et al., 2016; Lujala, Rustad, & Kettenmann, 2016).

rehabilitated national laws that facilitated large-scale mining, primarily in gold and nickel (see e.g. Dearden, 2012; Granovsky-Larsen, 2017; Hale, 2011).

Liberia also had an extractives industry before the end of the war, but despite the fact it had contributed to the conflict (Sawyer, 2005), the IFIs encouraged revitalization of the natural resources sector as a central plank of Liberia's post-war economic recovery strategy. Liberia's post-war Poverty Reduction Strategy, designed by the World Bank in partnership with the Liberian government, prioritized opening up the country to foreign investment, mostly to be channeled into palm oil, forestry, rubber and iron-ore, which would be extracted for export (see Paczynska, 2016, p. 298; O'Mahony, 2019).

In Bougainville, as in Liberia, extraction of natural resources had played a key part in causing war. Indeed, the Panguna mine, once the largest copper mine in the world, triggered a decade-long civil war and left physical, environmental and psychological scars across Bougainville. Customary landowners, aggrieved by the mining operation's serious social and environmental impacts, organized a campaign of industrial sabotage that led to Panguna's closure in 1989, and large-scale mining has been banned from Bougainville for the last 30 years (Adamo, 2018; Ginnivan, 2016). Despite this history, the IFIs have promoted mining as a key part of Bougainville's economic development: the World Bank's 2007 Country Assistance Strategy for Papua New Guinea, of which the autonomous region of Bougainville is a part, states, for example, "With the Bougainville Peace Accord and the establishment of the Autonomous Government of Bougainville, Bougainville could again become a prime destination for mineral exploration."

Natural Resource extraction as a route to recovery from war's harms?

When we look at these cases to assess the impact of the extraction and export of natural resources on the prospects for social recovery and the repair of war's harms, three main issues stand out. First, this strategy is simply not oriented toward or designed to meet post-war countries' post-war needs of social and physical repair or to improve the physical and economic security for the nation's citizens; that is not its goal. Second, to the extent that the extraction and export of natural resources is promoted as meeting any of the country's specific war-recovery needs (such as providing employment or government revenue), it tends to under-deliver on those promises. And third, when it comes to human security, extractivist policies often make things worse, not better.

Regarding the first: it is worth highlighting again the basic fact that extractivism and other elements of neoliberal approaches (such as agricultural policy that prioritizes production for export) are simply not oriented toward or designed to meet those post-war needs of social and physical repair or to improve the physical and economic security for the nation's citizens – that is not their main purpose. Instead, they aim to "strengthen the economy" by making the country as attractive as possible to global corporate finance – to be accomplished through, inter alia, making sure there is little in the way of labor or environmental protections, few barriers to foreigners amassing huge tracts of land or taking ownership of national natural resources, and making sure the state prioritizes using its revenue to pay international lenders the interest on its (often inherited, odious) debt. However much the neoliberal assumption is that economic growth will trickle down and be good for all, the reality is that heavily-indebted post-war states, if they are being pressed to service their debt, are unlikely to be able to invest in the remedy and repair of war's damages.

Regarding the second point: to the extent that extractivism is promoted as meeting any of the country's specific real war-recovery needs (versus simply just growth of the economy), it tends to under-deliver on those promises. The two main war-recovery benefits extractivism promises are increased revenue to the state via both royalties and taxation, and jobs. The promised increase in revenue is undercut, however, by the IFIs' prescriptions for how to attract foreign corporations in the first place. In Guatemala, for example, World Bank-approved "reforms" that facilitated large-scale mining included corporate tax exemptions and a reduction in the royalties rate from 6% to 1% (Dearden, 2012, p. 15) thus depriving the Guatemalan government of significant revenue much needed for development. In 2004, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (the branch of the World Bank that lends to private companies), gave $45 million support to Goldcorp for work on the Marlin gold mine, claiming that the mine's "taxes and royalties would equal 7 per cent of the government's annual tax revenue" (Dearden, 2012). The reality has been very different. In 2007, for example, royalties and taxes from the Marlin mine amounted to nearer 0.3 per cent of total government revenue (Dearden, 2012; also see Zarsky & Stanley, 2013, p. 138). Guatemala is thus capturing a relatively small share of total mine revenues and earnings of the highly lucrative mine.

In Liberia, the IFIs argued natural resource extraction would provide the government with tax revenue that it could utilise to improve public services, estimating that the royalties and corporate taxes generated by concessionary deals with foreign investors could bring in two billion dollars over ten years (IMF, 2010, p. 14). The World Bank and other donors concerned about Liberia's past experience with extraction and export of natural resources launched the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) to try and ensure wealth stayed in the country and was more evenly shared (see Benner & Oliviera, 2013). Despite GEMAP, and despite

foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing in considerable amounts, however, firms have avoided paying their full tax and royalties obligations (see Paczynska, 2016, p. 305; Global Witness 2017; Watkins, 2013, p. 63).

Given the sensitivities around mining in Bougainville, the IFIs consistently state the importance of good governance for the sector. Yet, to develop Bougainville's long-term mining policy and law, the World Bank appointed Adam Smith International (ASI), a UK-based neoliberal consultancy firm, to assist in drafting the Mining Act and regulations. Unsurprisingly, the resultant law seems designed to put corporate interests above local (Ginnivan, 2016; Provost, 2016; Fletcher & Prince, 2018).

As for the promise of jobs, the record has been little better. Although we will discuss jobs at more length in the next section, here we will just note that in Liberia, one of the key rationales for encouraging FDI was the promise of new employment opportunities and improved living standards. Neither objective was accomplished, even before the Ebola crisis exacerbated the situation. Secure, well-paying jobs have not materialized (Beevers, 2016; Paczynska, 2016; O'Mahony, 2019). Many are employed on the basis of the Sime Darby concession: on short term, three-month contracts that do not include health benefits, on salaries of three US dollars per day (Paczynska 2016, p.310). The same story of failure to deliver on jobs or raising living standards can be seen in relation to extractives in Guatemala (see Deonandan & Ortiz Loaiza, 2016). Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that the Panguna mine, if reopened, will provide sufficient jobs to enable societal recovery from war, especially given the more mechanized mines of today.[6]

[6] Modern mechanized mining tends not to require a big labor force, and mining corporations often employ international staff with the requisite training on a fly-in fly-out basis rather than train and employ local staff.

Regarding the third point – that on many dimensions of recovery from war and the need to create more secure lives for a post-war country's citizens, extractive enterprises frequently makes things much worse – there are a plethora of dimensions in which this is true. Because space does not allow addressing all of them, here we will look only at land and livelihoods, health, and physical and sexual violence.

There is no human security without livelihoods – the means of securing the necessities of life. And as those means are often destroyed in war, reconstructing livelihoods, whether they are subsistence livelihoods linked to the land, or livelihoods in the form of paid employment, is a crucial part of recovering from war. But development of extractive industries frequently has disastrous effects on subsistence livelihoods, affecting women, the rural poor and indigenous communities disproportionally. A central problem is that extractivism is a model that is imposed largely through land dispossession. This has undermined women's, especially indigenous women's, livelihoods and food security in many parts of Guatemala as they have lost the small family plots on which they produce the corn and beans they require to survive (Méndez Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015; also see Hale, 2011).

Mining (along with the expansion of biofuel production) has eliminated the option of renting land, and also eliminated access to the mountains, where food has been traditionally gathered or hunted (Méndez Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015). This undermines food security, and makes life particularly challenging for those who are assigned the task of providing food for families and communities – predominantly women.

In Liberia, as in Guatemala, the invitation to foreign-owned corporations to extract the country's natural resources has resulted in significant land-dispossession for ordinary people (see The Rights and Resources Group, 2013; O'Mahony, 2019). Forty

per cent of the country's total area is now covered by concessionary agreements (World Bank, 2018). This extensive land-grabbing has been facilitated by an approach that classifies land without visible development as 'idle and useless', and deems it available for concessionary agreements (Buntzel & Topor, 2013, p. 27). This is a breath-taking instantiation of the neoclassical economics blinders that feminist economists and ecologists have described. When all it counts as being part of the economy are forms of production that are paid and add goods and services to the GDP, neoclassical economics wilfully fails to perceive and acknowledge that "idle" land, and the ecological systems it supports, is actually active and useful. And it equally fails to perceive and acknowledge all of the ways that land *is* actively being used – for the informal, unpaid, and subsistence forms of economic activity, often undertaken by women, which are central to household livelihoods and community survival and identity. Such land-grabbing means water resources for fishing, forests for hunting and gathering herbs, and marshes for rice growing are claimed from local people (Buntzel & Topor, 2013), undermining food security, already at crisis levels due to the war (Paczynska, 2016, p. 304), and increasing women's burdens. The recently adopted Land Rights Act (2018) may restrict future land grabbing, but Liberia's experience indicates that provisions on paper are not always followed in practice (Paczynska, 2016; Brownwell, 2019; O'Mahony, 2019).[7] In Bougainville, the formal legal power of dispossession is more overt. Observers of the new ASI-designed mining legislation contend that it gives Bougainville's government the power to confiscate customary land, with those who resist facing stiff custodial penalties, provisions which nullify constitutional and common law protections (Jubilee Australia Research Centre, 2015; Lasslett, 2015).

[7] The law also cannot be applied retro-actively, and so cannot help those who have already been dispossessed (see O'Mahony 2019).

Extractive industries imperil food security not only through land dispossession, but also through despoiling and fouling the physical environment. In Guatemala, for example, at the Fenix nickel project, indigenous communities in the municipality of El Estor allege that land productivity and thus food availability has decreased due to airborne emissions from the mine (Deonandan, Tatham, & Field, 2017, p. 408). Local water supplies, too, have been reduced by overuse, or contaminated by the toxic chemicals used to extract minerals, causing health problems[8] and generating additional burdens on those responsible for finding clean water sources for drinking, cooking and cleaning – again, predominantly women (Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 408). At the Marlin gold mine, in the west Highlands of the country, about 47% of households near the mine depend on ground and river water for drinking, as well as crop irrigation and watering livestock. They are thus particularly vulnerable to exposure to cyanide and acid mine drainage from heavy metals (Zarsky & Stanley, 2013, p. 142).

In Liberia, as in Guatemala, the environmental impacts of extractivism are often severe, and further exacerbate the challenge for women to provide for their families, and maintain their own and their children's health (see e.g. Paczynska, 2016, p. 309). Meanwhile, income-generating opportunities that have traditionally existed have been undermined. In many concessionary areas, farmers are only allowed to grow food for family consumption and not permitted to sell the produce thus further limiting communities' ability to ensure food security. In the palm oil concession areas, communities have also been prevented from growing and selling wild palms, traditionally an important source of income generated by women (UN Women Liberia, 2014).

[8] Specific illnesses mentioned to be plaguing community members, as a result of effluent from the mine's refinery polluting Lake Izabal, a major source of the area's water supply, were said to be hair loss, rashes, and gastrointestinal problems, all occurring more frequently for children (see Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 208).

Equally disturbingly, extractive industries are often antithetical to human security at the most basic level of physical violence, including sexual violence. Just as armed groups often employ sexual violence as a way to get communities to flee and yield their land, extractive industries have used it for the same purpose. In Guatemala, for example, thirty years after Indigenous Mayan women were the victims of sexual violence at the hands of the Guatemalan military during the civil war, women in those same communities were again the victims of sexual violence, this time at the behest of the Guatemala Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Canadian Hudbay Mining, in order to undermine resistance to the mine (Méndez Gutiérrez & Carrera Guerra, 2015). In Liberia, people protesting the expansion of Golden Veroleum (GVL), a palm oil company, are reported to have been violently beaten, threatened and arrested (Global Witness, 2015; Brownell, 2019; O'Mahony, 2019). And, in Bougainville, those living nearest Panguna mine fear renewed violence if they resist (Jubilee Australia Research Centre, 2014).

Natural Resource Extraction as a route to address the inequalities underlying war?

Recovery from war requires not only the repair of the material conditions, structures and physical and social services that make people's lives liveable, but also the transformation of the economic inequalities that underlie structural violence and war itself. Extractivism, however, tends to deepen inequalities and even create new ones, whether by denying the state the revenue it needs to invest in the services and social infrastructure which would bring equality; failing to provide decent jobs for few but a small minority; exacerbating the burdens of those charged with care and social reproduction; or undermining land reform and other efforts to distribute a state's resources more equitably.

The accounts above made clear the way in which the IFI-promoted legislation around extractive industries robbed the Guatemalan and Liberian governments of considerable revenue, and how plans for Bougainville risk doing the same, despite IFI rhetoric about the importance of good governance. What the IFI approach misses is the sense in which the repatriation of the majority of the wealth produced by foreign corporations' exploitation of extractives is inevitable, even in best case scenarios of good governance; it has to be or corporations could not be induced to invest. Whilst this dynamic makes extractivism a disastrous strategy in many countries in the global south, it is particularly harmful in post-war contexts, where inequalities are urgently in need of transformation if a return to war, with its intensification of insecurities, is to be avoided. The missing wealth undermines post-war governments' abilities to invest in that which could address inequalities, including universal, free, quality education and healthcare, childcare, social care for the elderly and people with disabilities, and a transformative justice system.

Regarding jobs, the issues are not only that extractives provide very few decent jobs, and that the jobs are often short-term, as described above, but also that they privilege certain groups in the allocation of those jobs. When the mine was in operation in Bougainville, it prompted the rise of a relatively wealthy local elite who monopolised political and economic opportunities (Regan & Griffin, 2005). Frustration with the way that the mine's benefits were so unequally shared contributed in large part to the ten-year war. Likewise, large scale logging and agribusiness in Liberia is alleged to have largely recreated the arrangements that fostered corruption and patronage and exploited forest communities (see e.g. Beevers, 2016, p. 321).

The employment opportunities provided by extractivism not only reinforce inequalities that fuel communal violence, they can also exacerbate gender inequalities

which, whilst not directly contributing to reigniting conflict, contribute to violence in its broader sense. In Guatemala, mining employment opportunities have been predominantly open only to men, deepening women's economic dependence on men, and driving a rise in drinking, prostitution, and other disruptions to family life (Deonandan et al., 2017, p. 410). A similar account emerges of Bougainville's mining experience (Jubilee Australia Research Centre, 2014; Hill & Fletcher, 2018), and indeed, from most areas of the world where large-scale mining operates (Eftimie, Heller, & Strongman, 2009).

But the deepening of inequalities through extractive production is not limited to the effects of their employment practices. They too often exacerbate the poverty of the already-poor by undermining the livelihoods women and indigenous people once had, whether in artisanal and small-scale mining, in fishing or subsistence agriculture, or in income generating activities such marketing grown or gathered produce (e.g., as with Liberian growers and sellers of wild palms). Food security and health are further compromised by the ways extractives undermine the quality of the land, as outlined above. This deepens inequalities as it is the poor and marginalized who suffer most from depleted and degraded physical environments, especially those who are charged with care, social reproduction, and provisioning for their families.

Extractivism also undermines processes which are often initiated at war's end to address inequalities, such as land reform, justice and reconciliation programmes, and security sector reform. In Liberia, for example, the granting of long-term concessions to transnational extractive corporations may render the Land Rights Act impotent (see e.g. O'Mahony, 2019).

This section has, perforce, been but a brief look at one of the common elements of IFI post-war economic recovery prescriptions – the large scale, privatized, FDI-led

extraction of natural resources for export. Looking at how this approach has played out in three post-war contexts well-illustrates, we think, our two key points. First, it shows not only the disjuncture between IFI post-war economic recovery policy and real recovery from war, but also how the former actually frequently undermines the latter, as it too often leads to land dispossession, the undermining of livelihoods, physical violence, the despoiling of the environment, with concomitant effects on people's health and increasing burdens of care, and the deepening of inequalities. Second, we've argued that the failure of IFI post-war economic recovery policy to address the needs for real recovery from war is rooted not only in its neoliberalism, but deeper, in neoclassical assumptions about what the economy is for and its silences about care and nature. A feminist political economy approach, attentive to those who are most-marginalised, to all forms of violence, and to the gendered assumptions at the core of mainstream political and economic thought, is required to see the source of the shortcomings. Fortunately, it also generates the solutions.

IV. Feminist Alternatives for Post-War Recovery

Feminist scholarship outlining alternatives to extractivism, and to neoliberal policies more generally, is vast and extraordinarily rich (see e.g. Balakrishnan, Heintz, & Elson, 2016; Bauhardt & Harcourt, 2018; Leach, 2015; Raworth, 2017). It is thus somewhat surprising that there have not been more attempts to apply the insights of feminist economists and ecologists to the specific context of post-war recovery. For, as much as post-war contexts present significant challenges, as outlined in our earlier discussion of what is required for real recovery, they also offer "windows of opportunity" (Rees & Chinkin, 2015). For while post-war needs for remedy, repair and transformation are great, the period immediately following a war's political settlement is also a moment of great potential: large amounts of external support flow in;

constitutions are drafted, infrastructure is (re)built; economic plans are drawn up; and the social, political and economic arrangements that will structure the post-war society are being set. The UN has recognised this to some extent with its advocacy of "building back better." We argue here for something much more transformative than the UN has in mind with this slogan, however, drawing on some of the central ideas of feminist economic and ecological thought to suggest alternatives for post-war economic recovery that could create a gender-equitable, sustainable peace. We structure this section around two of the key insights of feminist economic and ecological thought, in order to demonstrate the ways in which the starting points are radically different from those of the IFIs. We can only hope to give indicative suggestions here, given both the breadth of feminist thought which means we cannot cover everything, and the marginalised position of such thought, which means that we have few concrete examples upon which to draw. Nonetheless, we hope to make clear the potential feminist thought has for doing economic recovery differently.

If we return, for example, to one key insight of feminist economics – that unpaid work is as important as paid work in determining the well-being not only of individuals and families, but also of the economy itself – how might that insight transform the priorities of post-war economic recovery policy?

The benefits of an approach to post-war economies that privileges care – and the infrastructure to support it – are obvious given the widespread needs outlined in Section II. Providing state-funded care for the injured and disabled – and for children and the elderly – would improve the lives of men and women, war-wounded and their care-givers alike, provide jobs, would enable those with dependents to combine their caring roles with paid employment; and would help societies recover from the impacts of widespread violence. Investing in education, in health, in the justice system – a

transformative social infrastructure – would rebuild lives damaged by war and address the inequalities underlying war. Such investments in Guatemala, Liberia and Bougainville could have produced a new social contract, which could in turn have enhanced the legitimacy of the post-war state, contributing to the sustainability of the peace.

And, if we return to one key insight of feminist ecologists – that natural resources, like unpaid labour, also need to be revalued, to be seen as part of an ecosystem upon which humans depend – how might that insight similarly transform the priorities of post-war economic recovery policy?

It would mean a turn away from the large-scale extraction and export of natural resources, especially fossil fuels. Instead, feminist alternatives could include renewable energy programmes, structural transformations to everything from transport to food production and distribution, and massive reforestation[9] – a move from extraction to restoration, regeneration and replenishment. Many post-war countries in poorest regions of the world have comparative advantages in renewable energy and have the opportunity to leapfrog to climate-friendly urbanization and transport strategies (Klasen, 2013; UN Women, 2014). If attention to justice and equality are built-in (which does not always happen with 'green economy' proposals but which are central to feminist ecological thinking (see Nelson 2009; Leach, 2015, Raworth 2017; UN Women, 2014)), reforestation, renewable energy and sustainable agriculture could provide plentiful employment and livelihood opportunities, vital for addressing gender inequalities and the inequalities underlying war. There might be extraction of natural resources in that feminist future, but it would likely be of a radically different model, involving small-scale extractive activities driven by local and regional interests and demands; inclusive

[9] Building on Wangari Mathai's inspirational GreenBelt Movement

of community and women's rights of participation, control, and ownership; and which supports societies to organise work on a collective, shared and equitable basis, such as that proposed by the Mining Working Group at the UN (Mining Working Group at the UN, 2014).[10]

The massive physical infrastructure projects created in order to facilitate the efficient export of extracted goods, currently prioritised by IFIs and post-war governments, would be replaced by the social infrastructure designed to support care, well-being and harmony with nature. Corridors of extraction, in other words, would be replaced by webs of provisioning. Feminist-inspired models would not use GDP growth or repayment of debts as a measure of whether a post-war country is recovering. Rather, the measures would relate to real recovery from war, whether the percentage of people receiving the care and the food they need, or the number of trees being planted or rivers running free of pollution.

Feminist economists and ecologists draw attention to a range of mechanisms through which such a transformation could be financed. Aid transfers to post-war countries are significant but currently – due to IMF rules – restrictions apply which preclude post-war governments from spending it to support an infrastructure of care; this could be changed. If investment in social infrastructure was classified as "investment" rather than "consumption," so as to recognise its "public goods quality," post-war states could invest more freely without infringing IMF limits on public debt (see Seguino, 2016; UN Women, 2015). More resources for an infrastructure of care would also be available if donors decided to forgive odious debts, an appropriate action especially because those debts were often racked up by the corrupt regime a war was

[10] Of course, any move away from extractivism also requires tackling cultures of consumerism, built-in obsolescence in technological goods, and other harmful ecological practices, which are situated predominantly in the global north.

fought to overthrow. Transforming taxation practices offers multiple opportunities: controls could be applied to cross border short term capital flows (e.g. Financial Transaction Tax); tax loopholes could be closed and more progressive tax regimes enacted (corporate tax dodging costs poor countries at least $100 billion every year (see Oxfam, 2019); Redirecting just a fraction of the resources spent on militaries and military equipment, some $1.7 trillion in 2018 (SIPRI, 2018), to post-war countries would enable significant investment in the transition from extractivism to an economy of restoration and care (WILPF, 2018).

Not only is the financing *possible* if the international community had the will to do it and were willing to throw off their neoclassical blinders: there is also basis in law for adopting feminist economists' proposals, as many feminists point out (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017; Rees and Chinkin 2015). The International Covenant of Economic and Social Rights puts obligations on states and, potentially, the IFIs themselves, to meet the economic and social rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, including the right to work, the right to leisure, the right to a decent standard of living and the right to an education. In fact, they are not only obligated to meet these rights, but to use "the maximum of their available resources" with a view to "progressively achieving the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights"

Although space does not permit exploration of additional elements of feminist economic and ecological thought, we hope the above examples demonstrate that it opens a rich vein of possibilities for developing post-war economic recovery policy that supports real recovery and peace that is more sustainable.[11]

[11] For further discussion of the potential, see Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, 2017.

Applying the insights of feminist economists to post-war economic recovery would not be without major challenges, of course. Among others -- they assume a strong role for the state to create, support and finance an infrastructure of care, uphold social and economic rights, and regulate environmental impacts, but in post-war settings, states are often weak, fragmented and beset by corruption. While the IFIs have partly recognised this with their push for good governance, we are arguing that good governance means far more than providing a stable environment for markets; it should mean an active, interventionist state that puts care and environmental principles at its heart. How you get from states which have been weakened by decades of structural adjustment policies, austerity measures and warfare, and which privilege patriarchal patronage relations over public services, to stronger states which prioritize social provisioning and environmentally sustainable forms of development presents a considerable challenge, for sure, and full treatment of it would require its own article, but we would suggest that it is a challenge that feminists must take on.

V. Conclusion

In this article, we have used an FPE approach to show how the IFIs' approach to post-war economic recovery undermines prospects for a gender-equitable, sustainable peace. We have focused on just one strand of the IFIs' approach – an encouragement of large-scale extraction and export of natural resources – in order to demonstrate the flaws. We have argued that even if the IFIs' attempts to instate "good governance" were successful, extractivism would not facilitate a gender-equitable sustainable peace. This is because extractivism – along with other strands of the IFIs' approach such as their emphasis on privatization, their insistence on fiscal balancing, and their encouragement of private investment in massive infrastructure projects – is geared towards recovery of

the economic system, and not real recovery from war. A key to understanding how the two can be so different, how *economic recovery policy* can be antithetical to the needs of a war-damaged society, can be found, we have argued, in the gendered assumptive framework of neoclassical economics. As such, feminist economic thinking which denaturalizes those assumptions and offers alternative visions of the functioning and purpose of an economy must become an integral part of our imaginings of how it is possible to enhance human security in war-torn countries and create gender-equitable, sustainable peace.

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